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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that through the conceptual distinctions between 
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology and The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, a proper understanding of transcendental 
idealism and ‘transcendence in immanence’ can avoid any metaphysical 
commitments of internalism or externalism, and reconfigure the debate on 
internalism and externalism by providing an alternative option. There are 
two interpretations towards whether Husserl is an internalist. The first one is 
that Husserl is an internalist as he employs the reduction method in order to 
‘returns to the inner mind’. The second interpretation, which is most 
welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic interpretation of Husserl 
and argues that neither internalism nor externalism can faithfully 
understand Husserl’s phenomenology because Husserl’s phenomenology does 
not tie to any tradition metaphysical commitment. Although I share this view, 
but an important text, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is neglected by 
the previous debates. In the text, it does not only reexamine the two levels of 
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of Phenomenology, but also 
introduces one more level of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. I shall argue 
that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence and 
transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect ‘transcendence’, so he cannot 
simply be employed into internalism, on the one hand; his phenomenology 
provides an alternative option rather than internalism or externalism. 
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The conceptual distinctions between ‘internalism’ and 
‘externalism’ are applied to moral philosophy, epistemology, 
philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Recently, 
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Husserl’s phenomenology has been employed into the debate on 
internalism and externalism. There are two interpretations. 
The first one is greatly influenced by Heideggerian 
interpretation of Husserl that Husserl is an internalist 
(Carman 2003; Keller 1999). The second interpretation, which 
is the most welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic 
interpretation of Husserl and argues that neither internalism 
nor externalism can faithfully understand Husserl’s 
phenomenology because Husserl’s phenomenology does not tie 
to any tradition metaphysical commitment, namely internalism 
and externalism (Zahavi 2004, 2008; Crowell 2008; 
O’Murchadha 2008). Husserlians within the second camp share 
three common beliefs that (1) the doctrine of ‘noema’ is not a 
representation, and Husserl does not commit to 
representationalism; (2) there is a tight link between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and externalism, but they are not equivalent to 
each other; (3) Husserl’s proper accounts of intentionality and 
reduction lead him to transcendental idealism which is an 
alternative option available than internalism or externalism. 
While I share these views, Husserl’s distinctions of ‘immanence’ 
and transcendence’ are drawn by the methodological steps of 
the phenomenological reduction. Most of them draw resources 
from The Idea of Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism 
(Hua XXXVI). However, an important text, The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology (“Aus den Vorlesungen, Grundprobleme der 
Phaenomenologie, Wintersemester 1910/11”, in Zur 
Phaenomenologie der Intersubjektivitaet, Hua XIII), is 
neglected. In this text, it does not only reexamine the two levels 
of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ in The Idea of 
Phenomenology, but also introduces one more level of 
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’. Through his explication, the 
very meaning of “transcendence in immanence” and 
transcendental idealism could then be defined. I shall argue 
that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence 
and transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect 
‘transcendence’, so he cannot simply be employed into 
internalism. 
The argument shall proceed in five sections. In section one, 
after a briefly presentation of how ‘internalism’ and 
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‘externalism’ are defined, I shall explain how the first 
interpretation employs Husserl’s phenomenology into. In 
section two, I shall examine a particular task raised by Husserl 
in The Idea of Phenomenology according to which the 
traditional understanding of ‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’ 
has to be critically examined. In section three, the importance 
of reduction method shall be introduced in order to make a 
proper account of intentionality. In section four, Husserl’s 
account of the three levels of consciousness and intentionality 
shall be explicated. Through the explication of intentionality, in 
section five, the three distinctions of ‘immanence’ and 
‘transcendence’ shall be drawn and the doctrine of 
‘transcendence in immanence’ shall be explained. Finally, I 
shall argue Husserl’s transcendental idealism does not only 
avoid any metaphysical commitments of internalism or 
externalism, but also reconfigure the debate on internalism and 
externalism by providing an alternative option. 
 
1. The internalism / externalism debate and 
Husserl’s phenomenology 
Within the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of 
language, Hilary Putnam’s definition in “The Meaning of 
Meaning” is adopted by debaters. He argues that “meanings 
just ain’t in the head” (Putnam 1975, 227). Putnam argues 
against the tradition concept of meaning, knowing the meaning 
of a word is determined in our mind. He gives a famous “Twin 
Earth” thought experiment. Oscar as an Earthian and Twin 
Oscar as his Twin Earthian counterpart have alike 
psychological states. Oscar and Twin Oscar both have the belief 
of what he calls ‘water’. However, Oscar talks of water when he 
refers to H2O; Twin Oscar talks of water when he refers to XYZ. 
Oscar knows nothing about XYZ while Twin Oscar knows 
nothing about H2O. Therefore, Putnam believes that “the 
(same) psychological state of the individual speaker does not 
determine ‘what he means’” (Putnam 1975, 270). And the thesis 
of meaning determining extension/ reference is largely derived 
from Frege. 
Taylor Carman and Pierre Keller are the scholars who 
explicitly argue that Husserl is an internalist. They have two 
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basic arguments. First, the reduction is the methodological step 
to return to the sphere of internal psychological state. Husserl 
strongly emphasizes the necessity of reduction method. Carman 
claims that “in methodologically turning away from everything 
external to consciousness and focusing instead on what is 
internal to it” (Carman 2003, 80). In this interpretation, 
Husserl is an internalist in the sense that the reduction method 
is appealed to what is internal to consciousness, namely 
noemata which is construed as Fregean Sinne (Carman 2003, 
68). Therefore, reduction is an evidence for the internalistic 
interpretation of Husserl. Second, Husserl shares the similar 
feature of most internalists committed to, namely 
representationalism. Keller asserts that “the narrow 
representational content that we are presented with in our 
individual private experiences is the ultimate basis for the 
philosophical investigation of the condition under which narrow 
and wide content are possible” (Keller 1999, 112). Keller does 
not explicitly explain what representational content is, but we 
can draw resources from Follesdal and Dreyus who believe 
Husserl is a representationalist (Follesdal 1969; Dreyfus 1982).1 
They believe that noema is an abstract structure by which the 
mind can direct towards external objects. Noematic Sinn is a 
complex descriptive sense which is inherent in noema. Since the 
abstract character of noema and noematic Sinn is an ideal 
medium which can never be regarded as something ‘outer’, 
meaning does not have direct connection with the external 
world. Therefore, they conclude that the ultimate basis for the 
philosophical investigation, in Husserl’s phenomenology, is ‘the 
inner’. But does Husserl commit to representationalism? Is 
Husserl’s doctrine of ‘immanence’ alike to what they 
understand as ‘the inner’ or ‘internal to consciousness’? 
 
2. The critique of traditional distinction between 
immanence and transcendence 
Before examining Husserl’s distinction between 
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’, we may have a look at 
Husserl’s critique towards traditional distinction between 
immanence and transcendence, so that we could understand 
the aim of the reduction method, a proper account of 
Tang Man To / Husserl’s Trancendental Idealism 
467 
 
 
intentionality and the distinctions between ‘immanence’ and 
‘transcendence’.  
“If we take a closer look at what is so enigmatic about 
knowledge, and what causes our predicament in our first 
reflection on the possibility of knowledge, we find that it is 
transcendence” (Husserl 1999a, 27). When we reflect the 
possibility of knowledge, we find that “the enigma about 
knowledge is its transcendence” (Husserl 1999a, 33). The 
known objects are something other than ‘I’, but how can we 
cognize the known objects? It is a long-lasting but important 
philosophical question. Husserl in The Idea of Phenomenology 
claims that “indeed, our lack of clarity with regard to the sense 
or essence of knowledge requires a science of knowledge, a 
science that dedicates itself solely to getting clear on the 
essence of knowledge” (Husserl 1999a, 25). His aim is to require 
a science of knowledge with clarity. But why is it so important 
to require clarity? And how do we seek to clarity? 
Facing the unsolid ground of epistemology, Husserl 
criticizes that “all of the basic errors in epistemology are 
connected to the above mentioned μεταβασιζ, on the one hand, 
the error of psychologism, and on the other, the error of 
anthropologism and biologism. This μεταβασιζ is exceedingly 
dangerous” (Husserl 1999a, 31). What does μεταβασιζ mean? 
Why is it so dangerous? “μεταβασιζ” means transition. Husserl 
introduces an argument that if knowledge which is not in the 
genuine sense given, then it is transcendent. If it is 
transcendent knowledge, then it has to be critically examined. 
All positive knowledge is knowledge that is not examined. 
Therefore, all positive knowledge is transcendent knowledge. 
Further, psychologism, anthropologism and biologism are 
positive knowledge. If epistemology is based upon these, then it 
would lead to errors, namely transitions (“μεταβασιζ”). 
Husserl proposes two criticisms towards these errors. The 
first one is their misunderstanding of transcendence, namely as 
physical phenomenon. The second one is critic of their 
misunderstanding of relationship between transcendence and 
immanence. Firstly, from the perspective of psychologism, it 
seeks transcendent object as physical phenomenon. Husserl 
argues that “psychical phenomenon” is always quite 
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questionable, and frequently misleading. It is because it, on the 
one hand, misleads people to say that perceived, imagined, 
asserted or desired objects ‘enter consciousnesses’, or to say 
that such objects ‘are taken up into consciousness’. On the other 
hand, it misleads people to say ‘consciousness’ or ‘the ego’ 
enters into this or that sort of relation to them, or to say that 
intentional experiences ‘contain something as their object in 
themselves’ (Husserl 1977, 557). In these senses, it claims that 
with different mode of treatment, the same physical 
phenomenon can be divided as an ideal object in perception or 
the external real physical object perceived.2 We are dealing 
with the relationship in which the object’s appearing consists 
(the concrete perceptual experience, in which the object itself 
seems present to us) and of the object which appears as such.3 
Then how does the physical phenomenon can be cognized? 
Secondly, from the perspective of anthropologism and 
biologism, Husserl criticizes that such expressions promote two 
misunderstandings of relationship between transcendence and 
immanence. The first misunderstanding claims that “we are 
dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) relationship, 
taking place between ‘consciousness’ or ‘the ego’… and the thing 
of which there is consciousness” (Husserl 1977, 557) The second 
misunderstanding claims that “we are dealing with a relation 
between two things, both present in equally real fashion (reell) 
in consciousness, an act and in intentional object, or with a sort 
of box-within-box structure of mental contents” (Husserl 1977, 
557) For the first misunderstanding, is it true to say that we 
are dealing with a real (realen) event or a real (reales) 
relationship? Is the relationship of cognitive contact between 
transcendence and immanence a real relationship? How is it 
possible? For the second misunderstanding, is it true to say 
that we are dealing with a relation between two things, both 
present in equally real fashion (reell) in consciousness? Would 
the second misunderstanding mix up the act of consciousness 
and the conscious object or object of givenness? If so, how can it 
draw a distinction between transcendence and immanence? 
How is it possible? 
Back to the previous question, why is transition 
(μεταβασιζ) so dangerous? Husserl explains that “this μεταβασιζ 
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is exceedingly dangerous, partly because the proper sense of the 
problems never made clear and remains totally lost in it, and 
partly because… easily slip back into the temptations of the 
natural modes of thinking and judging as well as false and 
misleading formulation of the problem which grow on their 
basis” (Husserl 1999a, 31). The knowledge of errors in 
epistemology, “then, is just human knowledge, bound to the 
forms of the human intellect, incapable of making contact with 
the very nature of things, with the things themselves” (Husserl 
1999a, 18). Therefore, Husserl suggests that this is true in that 
no knowledge can be counted as pre-given without examination 
at the beginning. He urged to perform epistemological 
reduction, “that is, all transcendence that comes into play here 
must be excluded… of epistemological nullity” (Husserl 1999a, 
30). 
 
3. The introduction of phenomenological reduction 
In epistemological investigation, if objects as 
transcendence are not critically examined, it should not be 
utilized as pre-given. In Husserl’s terminology, they are 
“epistemologically null” (Husserl 1999a, 34). Husserl asserts 
that the first and fundamental part of phenomenology in 
general is to attend sole the task of clarifying the essence of 
knowledge and known objectivity. In its task of clarifying the 
essence of knowledge and known objectivity, phenomenology 
designates a science. More importantly, it “designates the 
specifically philosophical attitude of thought, the specifically 
philosophical method” (Husserl 1999a, 19). The 
phenomenological attitude first requires “free from 
presupposition” (Husserl 1977, 263). How can it achieve the 
phenomenological attitude? 
 “Only through a reduction, which we shall call the 
phenomenological reduction, do I acquire an absolutely 
givenness that no longer offers anything transcendent” (Husserl 
1999a, 34). It shows that Husserl aims at acquiring absolutely 
givenness through phenomenological reduction. “Through the 
epistemological reduction we exclude all transcendent 
presuppositions, because the possible validity and sense of 
transcendence is in question” (Husserl 1999a, 37). In this sense, 
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the phenomenological reduction can achieve the 
phenomenological attitude. Then how does the 
phenomenological reduction perform? 
The phenomenological reduction is a way “to alter the 
natural attitude radically instead of remaining in this attitude” 
(Husserl 1999b, 57). One procedure is the attempt to doubt 
universally.4 This doubt “do not give up the positing we 
effected”, but the positing undergoes a modification. The 
positing remains what it is, but we “put it out of action”, we 
“exclude it”, we “parenthesize it” (Husserl 1999a, 59). It is 
changing of attitude from taking for granted to critically 
examination. Through phenomenological reduction, what can it 
remain? Through the reduction, “we shall go as far as is 
necessary to effect the insight at which we are aiming, namely 
the insight that consciousness has, in itself, a being of its own 
which in its own absolute essence, is not touched by the 
phenomenological exclusion. It therefore remains as the 
“phenomenological residuum”.5 Therefore, Husserl suggested 
that the phenomenological way is firstly to “keep our regard 
fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find 
immanently within it” (Husserl 1999b, 65). As the first 
interpretation mentioned above, Husserl is always interpreted 
as ‘internalism’ since through reduction, consciousness remains 
as the phenomenological residuum, and attains superior status 
comparing to the ‘outer world’. 
 
4. The three concepts of consciousness and the 
doctrine of intentionality 
In order to avoid the internalistic interpretation, a proper 
account of consciousness and intentionality is necessary. 
Through phenomenological reduction, Husserl, in Logical 
Investigations, uncovers that there are three concepts of 
consciousness.6 The first one is consciousness as the entire, real 
(reelle) phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the 
interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of 
consciousness (Husserl 1977, 537). The second is consciousness 
as the inner awareness of one’s own psychic experience.7 This 
third is consciousness as a comprehensive designation for 
‘mental acts’, or ‘intentional experiences’, of all sorts.8 For the 
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first concept of consciousness, in flux from one moment to the 
next, and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold 
ways, experience composes the real unity-of-consciousness of 
the individual mind. This concept of consciousness can be seen 
in a purely phenomenological manner, which cuts out all 
relation to empirically real existence. Take an example, when I 
see a red rose, the sense-aspect of color forms a real constituent 
of my concrete seeing. It is as much an ‘experienced’ or 
‘conscious’ content, as is the character of perceiving, or as the 
full perceptual appearing of the colored object. In this sense, “as 
belonging in a conscious connection, the appearing of things is 
experienced by us, as belonging in the phenomenal world, 
things appear before us. The appearing of the things does not 
itself appear to us, we live through it” (Husserl 1977, 538). We 
can draw a distinction: the relation of the phenomenal object 
(conscious content) and the phenomenal subject (empirical 
person, a thing) is different from the relation of a conscious 
content in the sense of an experience and consciousness in the 
sense of a unity of such conscious contents. The former relation 
concerns with the relation of two appearing things. The latter 
relation concerns with the relation of a single experience to a 
complex of experiences.9 
For the second concept of consciousness, it is expressed by 
talk of ‘inner consciousness.’ Husserl asserts that ‘inner 
perception’ is “to accompany actually present experiences and 
to relate to them as its object” (Husserl 1977, 542). The ‘self-
evidence’ usually attributed to inner perception shows it to be 
adequate perception. It is because this adequate perception 
ascribes nothing to its object that is not intuitively presented 
but intuitively presents and posits its objects just as they are in 
fact experienced in and with their perception. In this sense, the 
intentional perception corresponds with complete perfection, 
achieves adequacy. It is therefore itself a real (reell) factor in 
our perceiving of it. Therefore, we can draw a distinction: inner 
perception as the perception of one’s own experiences and inner 
perceptions adequate or evident perception. 
The second concept of consciousness refers to inner 
consciousness or inner perception. It is about the perception of 
one’s own experience and adequate or evident perception. To 
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bear a point in mind, Husserl’s inner perception is different 
from Brentano’s as he strong emphasizes. It is because in 
Husserl’s interpretation, Brentano’s inner perception 
reproduces what is ‘in’ the mind (inexistence), but Husserl’s 
inner perception is a reflection upon the pre-reflective 
experiences. Inner perception does not reproduce, on the one 
hand; it does not bring something ‘in’ our mind out. Instead, 
inner perception is conscious of pre-reflective experience, so it is 
‘the perception of one’s own experience’. The first concept of 
consciousness refers to the real unity-of-consciousness of the 
individual mind composed by experience and content. It is 
about the relation of two appearing things and the relation of a 
single experience to a complex of experiences. The second 
concerns with single experience but the first concerns with the 
relation of a single experience to a complex of experiences. On 
the one hand, Husserl, therefore, described that “undeniably 
the second concept of consciousness is the more ‘primitive’: it 
has an ‘intrinsic priority’” (Husserl 1977, 543). On the other 
hand, the second concept and the first concept show that the 
unity of the concrete phenomenological whole coexists. These 
‘unities of coexistence’ pass continuously from one into next, 
composing a unity of change, of the stream of consciousness. 
“This accordingly forms the phenomenological content of the 
ego, of the empirical ego in the sense of the physic subject. 
Phenomenological reduction yields the really self-enclosed, 
temporally growing unity of the stream of experience. The 
notion of experience has widened out from what is inwardly 
perceived, and that is in this sense conscious, to the notion of 
the ‘phenomenological ego’, by which the empirical ego is 
intentionally constituted” (Husserl 1977, 545). Up to this 
moment, we understand the first and second concept articulate 
to the phenomenological ego, but how can we draw such 
concept? Precisely, what is the condition of possibility for us to 
draw the first and second concepts of consciousness? 
Here, the third concept of consciousness has to be 
introduced. It is defined in terms of ‘acts’ or ‘intentional 
experiences.’ In such intentional experience, “things seized in 
their phenomenological purity, furnish concrete bases for 
abstracting the fundamental notions. There are acts ‘trained 
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upon’ the character of acts in which something appears, or 
there are acts trained upon the empirical ego and its relation to 
the object. “The phenomenological kernel of the empirical ego 
here consists of acts which bring objects to its notice, acts in 
which the ego directs itself to the appropriate object” (Husserl 
1977, 550). To be specific, intentional relation, understood in 
purely descriptive fashion as an inward peculiarity of certain 
experiences, is the essential feature of ‘physical phenomenon’ or 
‘acts’. In this sense, Husserl accepted Brentano’s definition of 
intentional relation as “phenomenon intentionally containing 
objects in themselves a circumscription of essence” (Husserl 
1977, 555). But there are differences between them. 
Firstly, Brentano believes that intentional experiences 
direct themselves to the presented objects. The direction is in an 
intentional sense. It seems there are two things present in 
intentional experience. Unlike Brentano’s doctrine of 
intentionality, Husserl clarifies that “there are not two things 
present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside 
it the intentional experience directed upon it… only one thing is 
present, the intentional experience” (Husserl 1977, 558). 
Secondly, as mentioned previously, the perceived physical 
object is not ‘in’ consciousness like Brentano’s claim. Husserl 
gives an example of having an idea of God Jupiter, the idea of 
God Jupiter is a particular sort of experience, but not “part of 
the descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand)” 
(Husserl 1977, 559). The idea of God is neither ‘inside’ 
consciousness nor ‘outside’ consciousness as it does not exist at 
all. It is an ‘intentional’ object rather than something 
‘immanent’ or ‘internal’. 
Through drawing distinction between Brentano and 
Husserl, we will find that he essential descriptive character of 
the intentional experience is intentionality. Intentionality, in 
previous description, means “conscious of”, “refer to” or “aim 
at”. If intentional experience is present, then through its own 
essence, the intentional ‘relation’ to an object is achieved, and 
an object is ‘intentionally present’; these two phrases mean 
precisely the same. In this sense, objects is not ‘internal’, but 
“are only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something 
presented (Vorstelliges) in the manner peculiar to 
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consciousness, something apparent <as apparent> (Husserl 
1999b, 113). 
 
5. The doctrine of intentionality and the conceptual 
distinction between immanence and transcendence 
In the analysis of the structure of experience, “the 
qualifying adjective ‘intentional’ names the essence common to 
the class of experience” (Husserl 1977, 562). It shows that our 
structure of experience is always intentional. Through the 
doctrine of intentionality, we understand that “an experience 
may be present in consciousness together with its intention, 
although its object does not exist at all, and is perhaps 
incapable of existence. The object is ‘meant’, i.e. to ‘mean’ it is 
an experience, but it is then merely entertained in thought, and 
is nothing in reality” (Husserl 1977, 558). Take having an idea 
of God as an example, if I have an idea of Christian God, this 
Christian is my presented object, he is ‘immanently present’ in 
my act or experience. It means I have a certain presentative 
experience, the presentation of the Christian God is realized in 
my consciousness. Husserl explains what ‘immanent’ is: 
“The ‘immanent’, ‘mental object’ is not therefore part of the 
descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the 
experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. These 
so-called immanent contents are therefore merely intended or 
intentional, while truly immanent contents, which belong to the 
real make-up (reellen Bestand) of the intentional experiences, are 
not intentional: they constitute the act, provide necessary points 
d’appui which render possible an intention, but are not 
themselves intended, not the objects presented in the act.” 
(Husserl 1977, 559) 
 
Here we can draw the first conceptual distinction between 
transcendence and immanence. This distinction can be found in 
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Husserl claims that the 
sense of transcendence is that “the object of knowledge itself is 
not present in the act of knowledge… It belongs to the essence of 
the intentional relation (being just the relation between 
consciousness and the object of consciousness) that 
consciousness, i.e., the respective cogitatio, is consciousness 
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about something that what it is not” (Husserl 2006, 64). This 
conceptual distinction articulates to the real make-up (reellen 
Bestand) of the intentional experiences. Immanent is relative to 
intentional. The ‘immanence’ refers to that real make-up (reellen 
Bestand) of the intentional experience. In this sense, the 
‘transcendence’ refers to that the intentional object, which is not 
really (reell) immanent. Therefore, Husserl, in The Idea of 
Phenomenology, explicitly describes that: 
“It (transcendence) can refer to the fact that the known object 
is not really (reell) contained in the act of knowing. In this 
case, ‘given in the genuine sense’ or ‘immanently given’ would 
be understood in terms of real (reelle) containment: the act of 
knowing, the cogitation, has real (reelle) moments that really 
(reell) constitute it…Here ‘immanent’ means ‘really (reell) 
immanent to the experience of knowing’.” (Husserl 1999a, 27) 
The first conceptual distinction between transcendence and 
immanence are drawn. It refers to the condition of possibility of 
experience of knowing, namely intentional experience.  
The second type refers to the adequacy of knowledge. The 
distinction results when we regard it as a classification of 
individual objects. Husserl asserts that according to this, 
“individual objects break down into those which could be given 
intuitively in absolute self-presence and those which can only 
appear as self-present” (Husserl 2006, 65). In the footnote, 
Husserl explains that the former could have existed only as 
having been perceived and they can be potentially recalled; the 
latter could have existed before all perception. How could these 
be understood? The very distinction between them is the 
change of attitude. Those which can only appear as self-
presence but not absolute self-presence remain in the natural 
attitude. Husserl regards them as transcendent. In a contrary, 
“every phenomenological consciousness is related to 
immanence; the immanent is the field of phenomenology” 
(Husserl 2006, 65). Through reduction method, this meaning of 
‘immanence’ could then be drawn as phenomenological 
reduction as a methodological step ‘creates’ the field of 
phenomenology, namely the second sense of ‘immanence’. If we 
understand the second sense of transcendence refers to objects 
which can only appear as self-presence and the second of 
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‘immanence’ refers to object which can be given intuitively in 
absolute self-presence, then we may ask what the essential 
features of this sense of ‘immanence’ is? What is the meaning of 
‘absolute self-presence? 
In The Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl explains that, 
“But there is another sense of transcendence, whose counterpart 
is an entirely different kind of ‘immanence’, namely absolute and 
clear givenness, self-givenness in the absolute sense. This 
givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists of an 
immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity 
itself as it is. It constitutes the precise concept of evidence, 
understood as immediate evidence. All knowledge that is not 
evident, that refers to or posits what is objective, but does not see 
it for itself, is transcendent in this second sense. In such 
knowledge we go beyond what is given in the genuine sense, 
beyond what can be directly seen and apprehended.” (Husserl 
1999a, 28) 
Precisely, ‘immanence’ refers to that is absolute and clear 
givenness, self-givenness in the pure phenomenological sense. 
This givenness, which excludes any meaningful doubt, consists 
of an immediate act of seeing and apprehending the meant 
objectivity itself as it is. “Absolute givenness” refers to “seeing, 
grasping what is self-given, insofar as it is an actual seeing that 
presents an actual self-givenness and not a givenness that 
refers to something not given-that is something ultimate. This 
is absolute self-givenness (absolute Selbstverständlichkeit)” 
(Husserl 1999a, 38). It is relative to inadequate and unclear 
givenness, not self-givenness. “Transcendence” refers to 
inadequate and unclear givenness, not self-givenness in pure 
phenomenological sense. On the first case, this conceptual 
distinction articulates to reflective thinking and the second 
concept of consciousness as the inner awareness of one’s own 
psychic experience. When we reflect on our inner awareness of 
one’s own previous perceptual experience, it is adequate 
givenness if we can consist of an immediate act of seeing and 
apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is. It is 
inadequate givenness if we cannot consist of an immediate act 
of seeing and apprehending the meant objectivity itself as it is 
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or the meant objectivity itself is posited rather than self-
givenness. 
 Apart from the two distinctions mentioned above, there 
is the third ways of understanding ‘immanence’ and 
transcendence which cannot be found in The Idea of 
Phenomenology, but The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
only. ‘Immanence’ refers to which is present in the flesh to 
consciousness, and transcendence refers to which is meant 
without such self-presence. Husserl explains what he means, 
“On the side of immanence is only that which is seen (and, at 
the most, one could also say that the seeable of this kind is so 
united with the actual seen that a change in the reflective 
stance could lead from the one to the other), whereas on the 
side of transcendence would everything else, foremost 
everything non-present, albeit as an object of consciousness.” 
(Husserl 2006, 64) 
During this lecture in 1910-1911, Husserl delivered the time-
consciousness lecture already. In the lecture, he uncovers the 
importance of retention. “As reflection [reduction] makes clear, 
the vitally present seeing is one with the vitally present seen.” 
(Husserl 2006, 64) These two constitute the unity of the 
present. However, even if retention reproduces something 
which had been seen, this remembered or reproduced 
memories is meant without its self-presence but is meant as a 
presence of absence. Therefore, it would be transcendent to the 
present remembering consciousness. In this sense, Husserl is 
true to say that “phenomenology does not want to disconnect 
transcendence in every sense” (Husserl 2006, 65). 
On the one hand, reduction is a methodological step that 
draws the three distinctions between ‘immanence’ and 
transcendence. On the other hand, the reduction method 
guarantees a proper understanding of ‘immanence’ and 
transcendence. ‘Immanence’ as the field of phenomenology 
does not disconnect transcendence, but constitutes 
transcendence in a proper way. As Jan Patočka in An 
Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology well explicated, “the 
task of phenomenology is not to eliminate all objectivity but to 
ground objectivity itself in immanence… here the third stage 
begins, from absolute immanence to the discovery of 
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transcendence in immanence” (Patočka 1996, 92-3). It means 
that phenomenology as special method and special thought of 
attitude, through the methodological steps, demonstrates how 
transcendence is correlated to immanence.  
To summarize the distinction, the first distinction is a 
classification of intentionality. The ‘immanence’ refers to that 
real make-up (reellen Bestand) of the intentional experience. 
The ‘transcendence’ refers to that the intentional object, which 
is not really (reell) immanent. Objects as transcendence are 
only intentional, only an intentional object of intentional 
experience. The second distinction is a classification of 
individual objects. The ‘immanence’ refers to those which can be 
given intuitively in absolute and clear self-givenness in the 
pure phenomenological sense. The ‘transcendence’ refers to 
those which can only appear as self-present in natural attitude. 
The third distinction is a classification of presentation. 
‘Immanence’ refers to which is present in the flesh to 
consciousness. The ‘transcendence’ refers to which is meant 
without such self-presence. These can be derived as following: 
 
Before phenomenological reduction 
Transcendence (3): objects which is meant without such self-
presence 
Transcendence (2): objects which can only appear as self-present in 
natural attitude 
After phenomenological reduction 
Immanence (3): objects which is present in the flesh to 
consciousness 
Immanence (2): which can be given intuitively in absolute self-
givenness 
Immanence (1): Real make-up (essential 
structure) of consciousness 
Transcendence (1): 
Intentional objects 
 
More important, we could find two important points in 
Husserl’s phenomenology. First, the distinction is guided by the 
reduction method. Second, phenomenology does not disconnect 
transcendence in every sense. For example, I hear a tone A in 
pre-reflective state which is in the natural attitude. The tone is 
transcendent object in the second sense. Through the reduction, 
the tone A is reflected and is brought to immanence through the 
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disengagement of natural attitude. The tone A is now ‘in’ the 
field of phenomenology. But it is still transcendent in the first 
sense as it is not the essential structure of consciousness but 
the object pole of an intentional experience. More important, 
through the reduction method, the past tone A which is 
thematically reflected and reproduced as a presence of the 
absence, as it were. It is the third sense of transcendence as it 
is meant without presence as presence. The relationship can be 
derived the following schema which is suggested by Rudolf 
Boehm (1965) with modification: 
The schema shows that ‘pure’ or ‘phenomenological’ immanence 
does not exclude all real transcendence. Instead, it connects 
intentional immanence with is a real transcendence. That’s the 
very meaning of ‘transcendence in immanence’. Therefore, 
Husserl could not simply be employed into internalism as 
Husserl’s doctrine of immanence is not an enclosed box-like-
mind. 
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, through the explications of three levels of 
the distinction between immanence and transcendence, we will 
find that Husserl’s phenomenology does not commit to any 
metaphysical presupposition of internalism and externalism. 
One the one hand, Husserl’s doctrine of ‘immanence’ and 
‘transcendence’ does not equivalent to ‘internalism’ and 
‘externalism’. Immanence does not mean the ‘inner’ or internal 
mind or object ‘in’ the self-contained box-like-mind which 
disconnects to the ‘external’ world. Instead, through the 
reduction, transcendent object is reflected and is constituted. 
Paul Ricoeur, in Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology, 
well formulates that “as it appears to a consciousness, one can 
say that the object transcends that consciousness and likewise 
that the object is in that consciousness; but it is there 
specifically by virtue of being intentional and not by virtue of 
being a really inherent part of consciousness” (Ricoeur 1967, 8). 
On the other hand, Husserl does not share the same features of 
representationalism. As his criticisms of Brentano in Logical 
Investigations, there are not two things present in experience, 
but only one thing is present, the intentional experience. 
Through the reduction method, what is given intuitively is not 
representation ‘in’ our mind, but is direct to the experience as it 
were. It is clear that transcendental phenomenology firstly 
signifies a special method and attitude of thought. And “the 
reduction less and less signifies a ‘return to the ego’ and more 
and more ‘return from logic to antepredicative’, to the 
primordial evidence of the world” (Ricoeur 1967, 12). Therefore, 
Husserl’s phenomenology could hardly be identified as 
internalist, but provides an alternative option towards the 
debate. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 In this paper, I am not going to criticize the interpretation. Please refer to 
Drummond, 1990. 
2 “Real” and “Reell” are two different concepts. “Real” is relative to “ideal”. 
Real object refers to physical object, namely trees and tables. Ideal object 
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refers to concept, namely number and theories. “Reel” is relative to 
“intentional”. Consciousness contains reell content and intentional content. 
The reell content of consciousness refers to “the act of consciousness”. The 
intentional content of consciousness refers to “conscious object” and the way of 
givenness. 
3 It is because the difference between a conscious content in perception and 
the external object perceived in it (perception), is a mere difference in mode of 
treatment between, the same appearance being at one time dealt with in a 
subjective connection (in connection with appearances which relate to an ego), 
and at other time in an objective connection (in connection with the things 
themselves) (Husserl 1977, 538). 
4 Husserl emphasizes that there is difference between Cartesian universal 
doubt and his phenomenological reduction. “We start from here, but at the 
time emphasize that the attempt to doubt universally shall serve us only as a 
methodic expedient for picking out certain points which, as included in its 
essence, can be brought to light and made evident by means of it” (Husserl 
1999b, 58). Husserl emphasized the difference between Cartesian universal 
doubt and his phenomenological reduction because Cartesian universal doubt 
is a method of negating positing or something doubtful. But universal doubt 
as a procedure of the phenomenological reduction effects a certain annulment 
of positing. The annulment in question is not a transmutation of positing into 
counter positing, of position into negation (Husserl 1999b, 58). 
5 “The phenomenological reduction will deserve its name only by means of this 
insight; the fully conscious effecting of that reduction will prove itself to be 
the operation necessary to make ‘pure’ consciousness, and subsequently the 
whole phenomenological region, accessible to us” (Husserl 1999b, 65-6). It 
shows that the phenomenological residuum is pure consciousness. But bear a 
point in mind, pure consciousness is not a box-like-mind, but the whole 
phenomenological region or the field of phenomenology. 
6 Rudolf Bernet and Theodorus de Boer argue that the term of epoché and 
reduction first appeared in 1907, but Husserl performed reduction method 
since Logical Investigations (See Husserl 1985, XX; de Boer 1995, 362-3).  
7 By the first and second concepts of consciousness, “not only is it evident that 
I am: self-evidence also attaches countless judgments of the form I perceive 
this or that, where I not merely think, but am also self-evidently assured, that 
what I perceive is given as I think of it, that I apprehend the thing itself, and 
for what it is” (Husserl 1977, 544). 
8 In phenomenological sense, “there are acts ‘trained upon’ the character of 
acts in which something appears, or there are acts trained upon the empirical 
ego and its relation to the object.” (Husserl 1977, 550). It means that “the 
empirical ego consists of acts which bring objects to its notice, acts in which 
the ego directs itself to the appropriate object” (Husserl 1977, 550). 
9 See Husserl 1977, 538-9. To have a better understanding of the single-
complex or part-whole logic in Husserl, please refer to Solowoski 1977. 
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